Abstract. In this paper, we focus on attacks and defense mechanisms in additive reputation systems. We start by surveying the most important protocols that aim to provide privacy between individual voters. Then, we categorize attacks against additive reputation systems considering both malicious querying nodes and malicious reporting nodes that collaborate in order to undermine the vote privacy of the remaining users. To the best of our knowledge this is the first work that provides a description of such malicious behavior against such systems. In light of this analysis we demonstrate the inefficiencies of existing protocols.
Introduction
During the last few years, online communities have experienced a significant amount of growth. Among the main factors contributing to their increased popularity is user-friendliness and ease of understanding but also accessibility and availability of information and services. These characteristics make it easy, even for novice users, to exchange information with strangers in way that guarantees a certain degree of anonymity. However, these features can be abused by malicious users who can either impersonate other entities and launch various types of attacks under fake identities or provide negative feedback for well behaving users, irrespective of the service they have received.
Reputation systems have been proposed as the means to protect online communities from such malicious behavior. The main goal of a reputation system is to reduce the risk involved in interactions between strangers by collecting, distributing and aggregating feedback about participants' past behavior in order to predict possible future behavior and identify dishonest community members [5] . However, one concern about reputation systems, which has received relatively little attention in the literature, is that of feedback providers' privacy. Although there are many reputation and trust establishment schemes, only some of them deal with the problem of securing the votes or ratings of participating nodes. This lack of privacy can lead to several problems including the proper functioning of the network. For example, it has been observed in [4] that users of a reputation system may avoid providing honest feedback in fear of retaliation, if reputation scores cannot be computed in a privacy-preserving manner. Additionally, the absence of schemes that provide (partial) privacy in decentralized environments, such as ad hoc networks, is even larger.
Hence the development of reputation protocols that can be used to provide anonymous feedback is essential to the survivability of online communities and electronic marketplaces. In some sense, provision of anonymous feedback to a reputation system is analogous to that of anonymous voting in electronic elections. It potentially encourages truthfulness by guaranteeing secrecy and freedom from explicit or implicit influence. Although this freedom might be exploited by dishonest feedback providers, who tend to report exaggerated feedbacks, it seems highly beneficial for honest users, protecting the latter from being influenced by malicious behavior [5] .
In this invited paper we present a theoretical analysis of the vulnerabilities of existing decentralized additive reputation systems, regarding the privacy of individual votes. A decentralized system is one in which there is no central repository to collect and report reputation scores. In such a system, the users themselves are responsible for maintaining a local repository of trust ratings and providing feedback when queried by other users. To the best of our knowledge this is the first work that provides a description of malicious behavior/attacks against such systems. We use this categorization to demonstrate the inefficiencies of existing protocols in the hope to spawn further research in the area.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we define the problem of secure trust aggregation and we define the basic terms that we use in the rest of the paper. In Sections 3, 4 and 5 we present the details of the most important protocols that allow ratings to be (partially) private in decentralized additive reputation systems. In Section 6, we present attacks that can break the privacy of the presented protocols and in Section 7 we conclude the paper.
Problem Statement & Definitions
Definition 1: A Reputation System R is said to be a Decentralized Additive Reputation System if it satisfies the following two requirements:
1. Feedback collection, combination and propagation are implemented in a decentralized way. 2. Combination of feedbacks provided by nodes is calculated in an additive manner.
In trust management and reputation schemes nodes in a network have in general two ways of collecting information about other nodes. They use either first-hand information (Direct Trust) or second-hand information (Third-Party Trust) in order to evaluate other nodes. A trust establishment framework evaluates neighboring nodes based on direct observations while trust relations between two nodes with no prior direct interactions are built through a combination of opinions from intermediate nodes. In this work we are concerned with the following problem:
Problem Statement: A querying node A q , receives a request from a target node A t . Since A q has incomplete information about A t , she asks other nodes in the network to give their votes about A t . Let U = {U 1 , · · · , U n } be a set with all nodes that A q asks to vote. The problem is to find a way that each vote (v i ) remains private while at the same time A q would be in position of understanding what voters, as a whole, believe about A t , by evaluating a sum of all votes (
All the protocols that are presented in this paper assume that the adversary is semi-honest (for a definition see Section 6). For the following sections, we assume that each node (A q , U i , i ∈ [1, n]) has generated a public/private key pair (k Aq /K Aq , k Ui /K Ui ). The private key is kept secret, while the public key is shared with the rest of the nodes. The vote of U i concerning A t is denoted by v i .
Pavlov et al. Schemes [5]
Pavlov et al. [5] showed that there are limits on supporting perfect privacy in decentralized reputation systems. More precisely, they showed that when n − 1 dishonest peers collude with the querying node to reveal the reputation rating of the remaining honest node then perfect privacy is not feasible. In addition, they suggested a probabilistic scheme for peers selection to ensure that such a scenario will occur with small probability and they proposed three protocols that allow ratings to be privately provided in decentralized additive reputation systems.
Protocol 1 (Figure 1(a))
During the initialization step, A q creates the set U with all voters, orders them in a circle: A q → U 1 → · · · → U n and sends to each U i the identity of his successor in the circle. Next, A q generates a random number r q such that r q = 0 and sends it to the first node in the circle, U 1 . Upon reception, U 1 adds his vote v 1 and sends to his successor the sum r q + v 1 . Each remaining node in the list follows the same procedure. Finally, the last node will send back to A q the sum r q + n i=0 v i . Upon reception, A q will subtract r q and will divide the remaining number by n. The result will be the average of all votes in the set U .
Protocol 2 (Figure 1(b))
During the initialization step, A q creates the set U , sends to each U i , i ∈ [1, n] the whole list U and generates a random number r q such that r q = 0. Each of the n + 1 nodes (including A q ) split their votes (A q splits r q = r q,1 + · · · + r q,n ) into n+1 shares in the following way: U i chooses n random numbers r i,1 , · · · , r i,n such that v i = r i,1 + · · · + r i,n and calculates r i = r q,i − n k=1 r i,k . He keeps r i and sends r i,1 , · · · , r i,n to the n other nodes, such that each node U j receives r i,j . At the next step, each U j calculates val j = n i=1 (r i,j ) + r j and sends val j to A q . Upon reception, A q calculates the sum of n votes n i=1 (val i ) − r q , divides by n and finds the average of votes.
Protocol 3
The goal of this protocol is to ensure that reputation ratings lie within a predefined range. It uses Pederson's [1] verifiable secret sharing scheme to support validity checking of the feedback values provided by voters.
The authors assume that the values of votes v i are integers in the G q group of prime order q. In the initialization step, A q selects a group G q of a large prime order q with generators g and h, where log g h is hard to find. Then she sends to each U i the list U of all nodes along with g and h. Each U i creates two polynomials of degree n:
and q i (j) along with the commitments of his polynomials of the form:
and sends s m and t m to A q which calcu-
the Lagrange polynomial at 0 and in this case could be expressed by
4 k-Shares Protocol [7] Hasan et al. [7] proposed a privacy preserving reputation protocol under the semi-honest model. The authors were inspired from the second Pavlov protocol and their goal was to reduce the message complexity to O(n). It's main difference from the protocol of Section 3.2 is that each user U i sends its shares to at most k < n − 1 "trustworthy" agents whose behavior in the context of preserving privacy can be "assured" by U i .
During initialization, A q sends to each U i the whole list U . Each U i selects up to k nodes from U in such a way that the probability that all the selected nodes will collude to break U i 's privacy, is low.
. At this point A q has also received the A i sets and can, thus, calculate the list of nodes that each U i should expect to receive shares from. A q sends this list to each U i which in turns proceeds to receive shares from the nodes of the list that A q provided with. U i computes the sum of all shares that were received as well as his own share r i,k+1 . The last step for each voter is to send back to A q the previous calculated sum σ i . A q calculates the sum n i=1 σ i and divides it by n in order to find the average of all the votes.
Dolev et al. Protocols
Dolev et al. [8] proposed four decentralized schemes where the number of messages exchanged is proportional to the number of participants. The first two protocols (AP and WAP protocol) assume that A q is not compromised while the next two protocols, namely MPKP and MPWP assume that any node that participates in the protocol can act maliciously.
Apart from that, all the proposed schemes are based heavily on a secure homomorphic cryptosystem. More precisely, the AP and WAP protocols are based on the Paillier cryptosystem [3] , while MPKP and MPWP are based on the Benaloh cryptosystem [2].
Multiple Private Keys Protocol (MPKP)
During initialization, A q creates two (1 × n) vectors. The trust vector T V = [1 . . . 1] and the accumulated vector AV = [1 . . . 1]. In addition, she creates an accumulated variable σ with initial value equal to 1.
Fig. 2. Basic Steps of MPWP Protocol
MPKP is divided into two rounds. During the first round each U i splits his vote v i in n-shares (r i,1 , · · · , r i,n ). More precisely, U i selects his n-shares at random such that v i = n j=1 r i,j , encrypts each r i,j with the public key k j of user U j and multiplies it with AV [j]. At the end of the first round we will have
At this point, the second round begins. Each U i decrypts AV [i] with his private key K Ui , finds n j=1 r j,i , encrypts it with the public key k Aq of A q and adds the encrypted value to σ. Furthermore, he deletes the i-th entry and sends the updated T V vector to the next node in U . At the last step, A q will receive n i=1 E( n j=1 r i,j ) which decrypts it, divides it by n and finds the average of the votes.
Multiple Private Keys Weighted Protocol (MPWP -Figure 2)
This is the weighted version of MPKP protocol where the weights w i correspond to the trust level that A q has assigned to each U i , respectively. MPWP computes the weighted average of votes that are given by each individual U i .
At the initialization stage, A q creates a (1×n) vector T V = [E(w 1 ) . . . E(w n )], where w i , i ∈ [1, n] is the trust level of U i . Additionally, A q initializes a (n × n) matrix of shares T , where
and sets the accumulated value σ = 1. A q sends to each U i the T V vector and the matrix T . Upon reception, each U i generates a random number r i and calculates E(w i ) vi r i . Then he adds it to σ by calculating σ = σ · E(w i ) vi r i and deletes the corresponding entry from T V . At this point, U i shares his random number r i by replacing the i-th row of T with S i = {r i,1 } k1 . . . {r i,n } kn . At the end of the first round, A q receives the updated T V entry that is equal to
vi r i and the updated shares matrix T , where
A q , by decrypting T V will obtain n i=1 w i v i + r i . So, at this point A q knows the sum of all weighted votes along with the random numbers. This means that she needs to subtract n i=1 r i in order to calculate the average votes. In order to do so, a second round of the protocol begins where each U i receives T , decrypts T [][i] with K Ui and calculates n j=1 r j,i . Then he encrypts it with k Aq , adds it to σ and deletes the i-th column from T . After that, A q will receive σ = n i=1 E( n j=1 r j,i ), which decrypts with K Aq and finds the sum of all random numbers. Finally, she subtracts the result from T V and finds the weighted average of the votes.
Threat Model and Attacks
In this section we describe and categorize the various types of attacks that aim to break the privacy of the above mentioned schemes. All the protocols that are presented in this paper assume that the adversary is semi-honest. A definition for the semi-honest model follows:
Semi-Honest Model: In the semi-honest adversarial model, even malicious nodes correctly follow the protocol specification. However, malicious nodes overhear all messages and attempt to use them in order to learn information that otherwise should remain private. Semi-honest adversaries are also called honestbut-curious.
In all the cases, we assume that A q is malicious and can overhear every message that is exchanged between voters. If we do not make this assumption, the problem of trust aggregation has a trivial solution. Affected Protocols: Pavlov Protocols 1, 2 and 3, k-shares protocol, Dolev protocols AP and WAP.
-Querying Node Attack at Pavlov Protocol 1: A q has generated a random number r q at the beginning of the protocol and voters are adding their votes to that number one by one. This means that A q can find each individual vote by overhearing every message, since she knows r q . -Querying Node Attack at Pavlov Protocols 2, 3 & k-Shares Protocol: The random numbers that each node generates do not really offer any protection from A q or from any other curious adversary who overhears the channel. This is because the parts of the random numbers that are exchanged among the nodes are not encrypted in any way. (Figure 4 ): If A q is malicious she can ask each node from U to give their vote separately. By doing so, she will be able to find the value of all individual votes and thus easily break their privacy.
Affected Protocols: All protocols -Analysis: Normally, A q receives a sum of votes and that is the reason why she cannot understand the exact vote of each U i . In the case where A q asks each U i to vote individually (size of U is equal to 1), she receives one vote at a time. Thus she knows the vote of each voter.
3. Sandwich Attack ( Figure 5 ): In this scenario, A q is considered as malicious and arranges the nodes in U in such a way that all U 2k+1 or U 2k , k ∈ N Fig. 5 . Sandwich Attack nodes are malicious. By doing so, A q can use values from adjacent malicious nodes to calculate the random number of the legitimate node situated between them, thus finding all the individual votes in the set. This attack is effective on protocols where each node is sending either a random number that she has generated either a share of her vote to the next node in U .
Affected Protocols: Pavlov Protocols 1 2 and 3, k-Shares protocol, AP, WAP.
-Sandwich Attack at Pavlov Protocol 1: Even if A q could not overhear all messages, he could cooperate with every malicious voter in order to find the votes of the rest nodes. More precisely, each malicious user would inform A q about his vote as well as the sum that he received from the previous node. Upon reception, A q would subtract the vote of the malicious node and the random number r q that he generated at the initialization step. The result would be the vote of the previous node. -Sandwich Attack at Pavlov Protocols 2,3, k-Shares protocol: As we mentioned before, the random numbers are not encrypted with any key which means that the whole information is known to everyone who overhears the channel. The cooperation between malicious voters and A q is not essential, since A q can find the votes on his own. -Sandwich Attack at AP & WP: In both cases, the sum of votes is encrypted with the public key of A q and each U i adds his vote to the previous one, by using the homomorphic property of the underlying cryptosystem. Even though votes are encrypted this time, the encryption does not offer any kind of protection if A q is adversarial. Also in this case, the cooperation between malicious voters and A q is not essential, since A q can find the votes on her own. -MPKP & MPWP Resistance to Sandwich Attack: We assume that A q and U 2k+1 , k ∈ N are malicious (U 1 , U 3 , U 5 , etc). After the first round, malicious nodes will be aware of v 2k+1 , r 2k+1,i , r 2k,2k+1 , k ∈ N, i ∈ [1, n] values. At the end of the second round, A q will be aware of the following:
Since she also knows each v 2k+1 she can easily calculate
Since every node adds n j=1 r j,i to E(.), A q can find each individual sum. Table 1 shows a list of what A q knows at the end of the protocol and what information she is missing. By using these values, A q cannot find the individual votes from the legitimate voters. The only thing she can do is to approximately calculate the values since she knows that each vote v i is bounded from α and β. This is a legitimate assumption since Dolev et al. made the additional requirement that the homomorphic modulus, m must be identical for all users. This is possible under the Benaloh cryptosystem [2] , however, decryption can only be performed by trying all possible values and finding the unique value that decrypts correctly. Furthermore, a (degenerate version of a) sandwich attack can be successfully lunched only in the case where n − 1 nodes are compromised (as Dolev et al. mention in their paper). The weaknesses of the described protocols are summarized in Table 2 .
Conclusions
In this invited paper, we have presented a series of protocols aiming to provide privacy between individual voters in an additive reputation system. We have analyzed these protocols in order to see how they react when honest-but-curious nodes try to break the privacy and find the individual votes of other nodes. To this end, we have provided a description of malicious behaviors/attacks against these protocols by utilizing three different attack scenarios. Additionally, we showed that none of the existing protocols can build defensive mechanisms that provide resistance against all possible attacks. More precisely, all protocols are vulnerable to an "alone in the list" attack which may be the most difficult attack to handle. We are currently working on the design of a decentralized privacy preserving scheme based on homomorphic encryption that will provide effective defense mechanisms against the type of attacks described above.
